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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA JUL 152008 
) 
) 
DEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT 




IH RIVERDALE, LLC and 
GEOFFREY NOLAN, 
Defendants, Third-Party Plaintiffs 
v. 
MCCHESNEY CAPITAL PARTNERS, LLC 
GEORGE MCCHESNEY and 
NICK WALDORFF, 
Third-Party Defendants 


















ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendants have moved the Court for summary judgment on all counts of 
Plaintiffs Complaint. The parties did not request oral argument. After reviewing the 
record of the case and the briefs submitted on the motion, the Court finds as follows: 
I. FACTS 
In August, 2003, IH Riverdale, LLC ("IH") and Geoffrey Nolan, Defendants in 
this case, filed a complaint and a lis pendens on a property located in Clayton County, 
Georgia, (the "Meadow Springs Property") in a related case, IH Riverdale, LLC and 
Geoffry Nolan v. McChesney Capital Partners, LLC, et aI., civil action number 
2003CV73603 (the "Main Case"). In response, Michael McChesney, filed this lawsuit 
seeking a declaratory judgment that he was a bona fide purchaser for value of the 
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Meadow Springs Property, and alleging slander of title concerning the Meadow Springs 
Property. 
In January, 2001, McChesney Capital Partners, LLC ("MCP"), entered into an 
agreement to purchase (the "Purchase Agreement") a tract of land for development 
("Phase I") from 0&1 Development Company, LLC ("0&1"). The Purchase Agreement 
stated that at closing 0&1 would grant MCP an option (the "Option") to purchase an 
additional adjacent tract ofland (the "Phase II" property, also referred to as the Meadow 
Springs Property). On April 19, 2001, MCP assigned 50% of its interests in the Purchase 
Agreement to "Nolan or IH Riverdale, LLC" (the "Assignment"), including the Option. 
The terms ofIHlNolan's interests in the Option were to be defined in an operating 
agreement to be entered into at a later time. 
Riverdale Capital Investments, LLC ("RCI") was created to acquire and develop 
Phase 1. In order for the Phase I property to be acquired in accordance with IRS § 1031 
tax-deferred exchange regulations, MCP transferred its right to purchase Phase I to 
Qualified Exchange Accommodations LLC, who acted as an intermediary in the 
• transaction, and directed that the property be conveyed to RC1. 1 On June 13,2001, RCI 
closed the Purchase Agreement with 0&1 and developed Phase 1. Pursuant to the 
Purchase Agreement, after the Phase I closing, 0&1 and MCP executed another 
agreement for the Phase II1Meadow Springs Property. The terms ofIHlNolan's 
participation in the Option were defined in RCI's Amended Operating Agreement, 
granting IHlNolan, among other things, a right of first refusal (the "Right of First 
Refusal") to invest in the Phase II1Meadow Springs Property. 
I Jeb Beardsley, an attorney, advised MCP on the structure of this transaction and the other § 1031 
transfers involved here. 
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In 2003, Meadow Springs, LLC ("Meadow Springs") was created to acquire and 
develop the Phase II1Meadow Springs Property. After an assignment from MCP, 
Meadow Springs exercised the Option through a § 1 031 tax-deferred exchange.2 On April 
4,2003, Meadow Springs closed the Phase II1Meadow Springs Property and began 
development. 
In order to finance construction, Meadow Springs obtained a short-term $1.5 
million loan from Michael McChesney (the "McChesney Loan") while it sought long-
term financing. In August, 2003, Meadow Springs was in the process of closing a multi-
million dollar construction loan from Regions Bank, when IH and Nolan filed the 
complaint and lis pendens in the Main Case. IHlNolan claimed that they were prevented 
from exercising their Right of First Refusal to participate in the Option and filed suit in 
the Main Case to enforce their rights. The following day a copy of the complaint and the 
lis pendens was hand delivered to Regions Bank by Defendants' then-counsel. 
The Regions Bank loan did not close and Meadow Springs subsequently defaulted 
on the McChesney Loan. Thereafter, Michael McChesney foreclosed on the Phase 
II1Meadow Springs Property and purchased it through foreclosure proceedings. 
As a result of the lis pendens in the Main Case, and the title objection it created, 
Michael McChesney brought this action against IH and Nolan seeking a declaratory 
judgment and alleging slander oftitle. Meadow Springs also brought a similar lawsuit 
against IH and Nolan, civil action number 2007CV143869 (the "Meadow Springs 
Action"), alleging slander of title and tortious interference as a result of the lis pendens. 
In an Order in the Meadow Springs Action dated January 15, 2008, (the "Meadow Spring 
Order") this Court granted summary judgment for IHlNolan finding that IHlNolan had an 
2 Again, MCP's attorney structured the transfer, and at the time was president of Meadow Springs. 
3 
interest in the Meadow Springs Property, that the lis pendens was lawful, that its contents 
were privileged, and that IHlNolan's actions with respect to Regions Bank did not exceed 
the privilege. The Meadow Spring Order is currently on appeal to the Georgia Court of 
Appeals. 
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must 
demonstrate that "there is no genuine issue of material facts, viewed in the light most 
favorable" to the non-moving party, "to warrant judgment as a matter oflaw." Lau's 
Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (1991). See also, Danforth v. Bullman, 276 Ga. 531, 532 
(2005). 
The Court finds, as it did in the Meadow Spring Order, that the lis pendens filed 
on the Meadow Spring Property was appropriate. See Colony Bank Southeast v. Brown, 
275 Ga. App. 807 (2005); Aiken v. Citizens & S. Bank, 249 Ga. 481 (1982). 
Statements contained in a lis pendens are absolutely privileged. O.C.G.A. § 51-5-
8. The Court finds, as it did in the Meadow Spring Order, that IHlNolan's publication of 
the lis pendens and Complaint in the Main Case to Regions Bank did not exceed the 
boundaries of the absolute privilege established in O.CG.A. § 51-5-8. See, Panfel v. 
Boyd, 187 Ga. App. 639 (1988); O'Neal v. Home Town Bank, 237 Ga. App. 325 (1999). 
Plaintiffs Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that he is a bona fide 
purchaser for value of the Meadow Spring Property; that issue is not the subject of 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, or of this Order. Therefore, that issue 
remains unresolved. The remainder of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is 
hereby GRANTED. 
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SO ORDERED this 
cc: 
David Pardue, Esq. 
Kristin A. Yadlosky, Esq. 
,2008. ~~ ;5 dayofj 
~,~ 
ELIZAB TH E. LONG, SENIOR JU 
Superior ourt of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
HARTMAN, SIMONS, SPIELMAN & WOODS LLP 
6400 Powers Ferry Road, NW, Suite 400 
Atlanta, GA 30339 
David L. Rusnak, Esq. 
245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE 
2800 Marquis One Tower 
Atlanta, GA 30303 
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